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1 Introduction
Over the past few years, the development challenges
faced by fragile states have moved to the top of the
international development agenda. Partly, this has
reflected an apparent increase in the number of
fragile states in the world over the past two decades.
Since the end of the Cold War, some powerful
states have been much less willing and able to
support and maintain weaker states, making the
latter vulnerable to failure or even collapse
(Doornbos 2005). At the same time, globalisation
has created a range of economic, political and
security-related pressures that have overwhelmed
many weaker states (Clapham 2002). Combined with
internal political, social and economic conditions that
make countries vulnerable to the onset of civil war
and economic collapse – such as natural resource
wealth, ethnic diversity and large numbers of young
unemployed males (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier
2000; De Soysa 2000; Ross 1999; Auty 2004) –
these developments have dramatically increased the
incidence of state fragility in the developing world.
In part, the increased interest in the development
challenges faced by fragile states has also reflected
the feelings of insecurity in the West caused by the
terrorist attack in the USA on 11 September 2001
and subsequent terrorist attacks elsewhere. These
attacks have made it clear that extreme poverty,
economic backwardness and severe violent conflict
in fragile states are a threat to people, not just in
those countries but in other countries as well. The
spillover effects on neighbouring countries of various
civil wars in fragile states such as those in Rwanda
and Colombia during the 1990s have reinforced this
perception (Millett 2002; Gleditsch 2003). Many
international development organisations have
responded to these developments by making
improved conditions in fragile states one of their key
goals (DFID 2005; USAID 2005; World Bank 2002;
AusAID 2005).
This article explores how these organisations might
most effectively work to improve conditions in fragile
states. Many donors have been influenced by the
idea, associated with the work of Burnside, Collier
and Dollar (Burnside and Dollar 1997; Collier and
Dollar 1999; World Bank 1998), that aid is most
effective in promoting development in countries that
have sound policies and institutions. This would
suggest that aid should be redirected away from
fragile states, where policies and institutions are
generally weak, and towards other developing
countries. But donors appear unlikely to significantly
reduce aid to fragile states. As the World Bank
(2002: iv) has noted, to disengage from fragile states
would cause severe deprivation among the
populations of these countries, reduce their chances
of recovering, and increase the risk of state failure,
‘with its evident adverse effects, both regional and
global’. Indeed, the current global trend is towards
significant increases in global aid volumes, raising the
prospect of significantly more aid flowing to fragile
states (Manor 2005). At the same time, however,
rather than simply throwing more money at fragile
states, donors are actively trying to find ways of
working more effectively in them.
But before donors can work more effectively in
fragile states, they need to gain a better
understanding of the factors that shape development
outcomes in these countries. Devising better
strategies for engaging with fragile states requires
some sense of the potential for change in these
countries as well as the variables that shape this
potential. To this end, this article examines the
factors that have shaped development outcomes –
more specifically, outcomes vis-à-vis ‘turnaround’, a
concept that I define in detail later – in seven current
and former fragile states: Vietnam, Laos, Uganda,
Mozambique, Cambodia, Burundi and Indonesia. At
the same time, I also examine the role of donors in
contributing to outcomes regarding turnaround in
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these countries and assess the implications of my
findings for donor strategies for engaging in fragile
states. In presenting this analysis, I draw heavily on
the following articles, some of which are published
here: Fforde (2005) on Vietnam, Rosser (2005a) on
Laos, Robinson (2005) on Uganda, Kulipossa (2005)
on Mozambique, Hughes (2005) on Cambodia,
Lemarchand (2005) on Burundi, and Rosser (2005b)
on Indonesia. 
The structure of this article is as follows. In Section 2,
I define some of the key concepts that are given in
this IDS Bulletin. In Section 3, I assess the
performance of each of the current and former
fragile states in the sample vis-à-vis turnaround. In
Section 4, I identify the factors that have shaped
variation in the sample countries’ respective
performances regarding turnaround and in Section 5
I examine the role of donors in facilitating or
hindering turnaround. Finally, in Section 6, I assess
the implications of my findings for donor strategies
for engaging in fragile states.
2 Concepts and definitions
The notions of ‘fragile state’ and ‘turnaround’ are
central to the analysis here. In much of the
development literature – and in particular that
produced or commissioned by donors – these terms
are defined in terms of the perceived quality of
countries’ governance, policies, and institutions, as
measured by the World Bank’s Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The problem with
this approach is twofold. First, it suggests that the
principal development challenge faced by fragile
states is weak governance, policies and institutions.
Second, it suggests that there is only one way to
improve governance, policies and institutions – that
defined by the CPIA. The criteria that make up the
CPIA emphasise the importance of deregulated
markets, conservative macroeconomic and fiscal
policies and public administrative and other
institutional structures that provide transparency and
accountability (World Bank 2002, 2003). While it
could be argued that improving governance, policies
and institutions is an end in itself, my view is that
these states’ principal challenges are to overcome
economic stagnation, extreme poverty and severe
violent conflict. At the same time, as numerous
studies of the East Asian experience have
demonstrated, there are other pathways towards
these goals besides that defined by the CPIA (Chang
2005; Weiss 1999; World Bank 1993; Wade 1990;
Amsden 1989). In this way, the use of the CPIA as
the primary indicator of ‘turnaround’ confuses causes
with outcomes. Better definitions of fragile states
and turnaround need to distinguish between desired
outcomes and the models of development that are
thought to lead to them.
For these reasons, I have defined ‘fragile states’ and
‘turnaround’ in this IDS Bulletin to refer to particular
development outcomes rather than the supposed
quality of countries’ governance, policies and
institutions. More specifically, I have defined fragile
states as low-income countries that (1) are
performing poorly in terms of achieving real
economic growth; (2) are failing to significantly
reduce poverty; or (3) are experiencing severe violent
conflict or have done so in the recent past; and
turnaround as involving (1) sustained high levels of
real economic growth; (2) sustained significant
reductions in poverty; and (3) a durable cessation to
severe violent conflict.
This focus on development outcomes rather than the
models for achieving these outcomes is arguably a
more ideologically neutral means of defining fragile
states and assessing their development performance.
At the same time, however, I acknowledge that it
has certain weaknesses. One is that it focuses on
particular dimensions of development – real
economic growth, poverty reduction, and peace –
and ignores other important dimensions such as
gender equality, environmental sustainability and
inclusion and democracy. Another is that it relies on
what are to some extent arbitrary judgements about
how much real economic growth or improvement in
human development, or how few battle-related
deaths are necessary to constitute turnaround.
3 The cases
The seven countries on which I focus have varied in
terms of their respective performances vis-à-vis
turnaround in recent decades. Some – specifically
Vietnam, Laos, Uganda and Mozambique – have
performed well in turnaround and are no longer
fragile states. Cambodia and Burundi, on the other
hand, have performed less well in turnaround and
are still considered fragile states. Indonesia represents
a third category of country in the sample – during
the 1960s and 1970s, it achieved turnaround but
during the 1990s, it then experienced a renewed
period of fragility.
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Vietnam and Laos were the site of a destructive Cold
War-related conflict during the 1960s and early
1970s. The end of this conflict in 1975 ushered in a
period of relative peace and stability in both
countries but limited progress in terms of economic
growth. Between 1975 and the late 1990s, these
countries experienced erratic growth, periods of
recession and extreme poverty. In the late 1980s and
the first half of the 1990s, however, the two
countries experienced major economic booms
characterised by increased foreign investment and
growing exports, particularly in manufacturing. The
Asian economic crisis in 1997–8 brought an end to
these booms but the countries have still achieved
respectable rates of economic growth since the
crisis. At the same time, both countries experienced
marked improvements in their human development
index (HDI) during the late 1980s and 1990s.
Uganda was in the midst of a civil war in the mid-
1980s. Since then, peace and stability have been
restored to virtually all of the country except the
North, the economy has grown strongly (after a
short period of stagnation in the mid- to late-
1980s), and the country’s HDI has improved rapidly.
Mozambique endured civil war for 16 years until the
Rome peace agreement was signed in 1992 and a
UN mission was established in the country. Since
then, it has experienced relative peace and stability,
rapid economic growth and marked improvement in
its HDI.
Cambodia was severely affected by civil war and poor
economic performance during the 1970s and 1980s.
Since 1990, it has experienced continued violent
conflict but has managed to avoid a return to full-
blown war. At the same time, its economy has
grown strongly. It has not yet managed to achieve
turnaround, however, because it has failed to make
significant progress in improving human
development levels.
Burundi experienced relative peace and stability and
modest economic growth during the 1980s,
although it performed poorly in terms of improving
human development levels. In the 1990s, the country
descended into civil war and its modest record in
growth and human development grew worse.
Recent years have seen efforts to achieve a durable
war to peace transition but the country remains
fragile.
Indonesia was one of the poorest countries in the
world and experienced a severe economic crisis in
the mid-1960s. During the late 1960s and 1970s, the
country achieved sustained high levels of growth and
a dramatic improvement in human development
levels while avoiding severe violent conflict (at least
outside East Timor, which it invaded in 1975, and
West Papua, which was forcefully incorporated into
Indonesia in the 1960s). In the late 1990s, however,
the country experienced a partial reversal in
turnaround, characterised by a sharp drop in
economic growth.  
The fact that these countries vary in terms of the
dependent variable – performance vis-à-vis
turnaround – makes the sample a good one for
exploring the factors that determine why some
fragile states achieve turnaround and others do not.
At the same time, however, using a case study
approach means that my findings have a higher
degree of validity in relation to the particular cases
examined here than generalisability. Examination of
the dynamics of turnaround in other fragile states is
required to establish whether the findings here can
be generalised beyond the sample countries.
4 Achieving turnaround
What factors shaped whether or not the countries in the
sample achieved turnaround? In addressing this
question, it is useful to distinguish between the
‘durable cessation of conflict’ and ‘sustained high rates
of real economic growth and significant improvement
in human development levels’ dimensions of
turnaround. All the turnaround countries – or at least
those that experienced severe violent conflict prior to
achieving turnaround – experienced a cessation of
severe violent conflict prior to achieving sustained
high rates of real economic growth and significant
improvements in human development. In other
words, achieving a durable cessation to conflict was
the first stage in the process of turnaround. At the
same time, however, achieving a durable cessation of
conflict was not sufficient in itself to generate
turnaround. In Vietnam and Laos, for instance, an end
to conflict did not automatically lead to sustained high
rates of economic growth and improvement in
human development levels – it was more than a
decade before these things happened. This suggests
that different factors were at work in relation to each
of these dimensions of turnaround. My discussion
below is consequently organised according to these
two dimensions.
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4.1 Achieving a durable cessation of conflict
All of the countries in the sample experienced severe
violent conflict, as that term has been defined here,
at some point during the periods under examination,
except for Indonesia. In all these cases, severe violent
conflict initially came to an end as a result of one of
two main factors: a change in geopolitical conditions
or a military victory by one party involved in the
violent conflict. 
In most cases, the former was the important factor.
In Mozambique, for instance, the fall of the apartheid
regime in South Africa and parallel developments in
Rhodesia removed the rationale for governments in
these countries to continue supporting the resistance
movement in Mozambique. Similarly, the end of the
Cold War in the late 1980s provided the trigger for
peace in Cambodia by reducing the capacity and
willingness of various foreign governments to
continue supporting the different sides in the
conflict. In both cases, these changes led to
international efforts, led by the UN, to ensure a
transition to peace and the creation of a more
democratic political system. In Laos and Vietnam, it
was growing public opposition to the war in
Indochina in the USA and other Western countries
that ultimately led to the initial cessation of conflict
because it forced Western governments to withdraw
their troops. In the Ugandan case, however, such
geopolitical factors were not important. In this case,
it was the ability of the National Resistance
Movement (NRM) to defeat its opponents on the
battlefield that ultimately brought an end to the
conflict. Importantly, the war to peace transition in
Burundi has been less decisive, partly because the
strategic location of the country has meant that
geopolitical changes have had little influence over
the willingness or ability of warring parties in that
country to continue fighting, and partly because both
parties to the conflict have been able to maintain
viable military forces.
In all of the cases where an initial cessation of
conflict was achieved, this cessation proved durable.
Two further factors appear to have been important
in this respect. In Laos, Vietnam and Uganda, the
important factor was that the losing side in the
military conflict was effectively eliminated as a
political and military force – in these cases, the losing
side either suffered outright defeat or decided that
it could not win, gave up and went home. With the
enemy defeated or gone, the communist forces in
Vietnam and Laos and the NRM in Uganda no longer
had anyone significant to fight for control of the
state. To be sure, the NRM and the communist party
in Laos have both faced long-running insurgencies
since the end of their respective wars, the former in
the Northern part of the country and the latter in
regional areas dominated by the Hmong ethnic
group. But these insurgencies have either been
geographically contained or caused only minor
periodic unrest.
In Mozambique and Cambodia, where severe violent
conflict did not result in a clear military victory for
one side, the important factor was that opposition
groups were given a stake in the post-conflict
political order. In these cases, the opposition’s ability
to continue military resistance meant that their
interests had to be accommodated in some way in a
post-conflict political order if peace was to be
achieved. In Mozambique, this accommodation was
achieved by donors agreeing to bankroll the
opposition movement’s transformation into a
political party (Kulipossa 2005). In Cambodia, it was
achieved by the fact that opposition groups were not
only permitted to establish themselves as viable
political parties but, in the case of Funcinpec, had a
serious chance of winning elections. As the largest,
although not most powerful, party in the coalition
government that ran Cambodia after 1993,
Funcinpec gained access to state patronage resources
and largesse (Hughes 2005). The main threat to a
durable peace in Cambodia came from the fact that
the Khmer Rouge, another opposition organisation,
decided not to participate in the 1993 national
elections. But after the death of Pol Pot, the
organisation’s leader in the late 1990s, the Khmer
Rouge collapsed, in turn ensuring that it no longer
posed a threat to continued peace and stability
(Frieson 1996: 240).
The sample cases do not provide a clear
counterfactual example on this point – that is, a
country that fell back into severe violent conflict
because key opposition groups were not given a
stake in a post-conflict political order. But the
Burundian case illustrates clearly how the failure to
give such groups a stake in a post-conflict order can
serve to prolong conflict. In this case, as Lemarchand
(2005) argues, one of the key reasons for failed
peace negotiations in the late 1990s and early 2000s
was the fact that two major armed factions were
effectively excluded from them. Without a say in
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how the post-conflict order would be constructed
and run, they stood to gain little from a shift to a
more peaceful environment and, consequently, had
little reason to lay down their arms.
In summary, whether the countries in the sample
were able to achieve a durable cessation of severe
violent conflict or not depended, first, either on
changes in geopolitical conditions providing an
incentive for warring parties to lay down their arms
or the achievement by one party to a conflict of a
clear military victory over its opponents; and second,
on opposition groups either being eliminated as a
political and military force or being given a stake in
the post-conflict political order. 
4.2 Achieving real economic growth and human
development
As noted earlier, the countries in the sample that
achieved turnaround only made the required progress
in real economic growth and human development
after severe violent conflict had come to end.
Thereafter, the countries’ respective performances in
turnaround – and in particular this second dimension
of turnaround – depended on two factors.
The first of these was whether or not political
conditions emerged that were conducive to the
introduction of an, at least, modest programme of
market-oriented economic reform – or in the case
of Mozambique, the continuation of a programme of
market-oriented economic reform that had begun a
few years earlier. All the countries in the sample that
achieved turnaround introduced a series of market-
oriented economic reforms prior to achieving
sustained high rates of real economic growth and
significant improvement in human development
levels. These programmes proved crucial in reviving
economic growth and improving human
development levels in each case. By contrast, those
countries in the sample that did not introduce
programmes of market-oriented economic reform –
such as Vietnam and Laos in the 1970s and 1980s –
or did not sustain them – such as Burundi in the
1990s – did not perform well in this second
dimension of turnaround. 
The exact content of the economic reform
programmes adopted by turnaround countries varied
from case to case but included in all cases, the
introduction of conservative fiscal and other
macroeconomic measures and the deregulation of
trade and investment policies. In some cases, these
programmes also included measures related to
financial sector deregulation, civil service reform,
decentralisation and the privatisation of state-owned
enterprises. These reform programmes were modest
in the sense that deregulatory measures were often
partial and the programmes did not generally include
serious attempts to reduce corruption, create clean
and efficient judicial systems, or introduce much of the
other institutional infrastructure that is required for a
competitive market economy. Economic reform was
largely about the partial elimination of restrictions to
trade, investment and financial flows and, in some
cases, the partial privatisation of state assets rather
than a fully fledged shift to liberal markets. Nor did it
generally mean the building of institutional structures,
although in some cases – Uganda and Mozambique,
for instance – some significant regulatory and
institutional reforms were introduced.
Whether political conditions conducive to such
economic reform emerged in the sample countries
was determined by a variety of contextually specific
factors. In most cases, broad shifts in internal
structures of power and interest or geopolitical
environment played the key role in this respect. But
other factors such as leadership, donor leverage, and
competition between competing political forces also
figured in some cases. 
In Indonesia, it was the political victory of the military
and other counter-revolutionary forces over
communist and radical nationalist forces, the fall of
President Sukarno and his replacement by Suharto,
and moves by the USA and other Western countries
to support its new ally in its global struggle against
communism during the mid-1960s that created the
political conditions for market-oriented economic
reform (Rosser 2005b). In Laos, it was the end of the
Cold War – which forced the government to seek
greater aid and assistance from the West and in turn
agree to the reforms demanded by Western donors –
and a growing realisation on the part of the country’s
political leadership that its socialist economic agenda
had not worked which were the crucial factors in
creating the conditions for reform (Rosser 2005a). In
Vietnam, it was the growing power of state-owned
enterprises and their managers and the end of the
Cold War that laid the political basis for reform.
When Soviet aid dried up following the end of the
Cold War, the incentive for state-owned enterprises
to participate in central planning disappeared – with
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central planners no longer able to provide these
enterprises with material resources, their ability to
enforce targets on these enterprises declined
enormously (Fforde 2005). In Cambodia, the end of
the Cold War was also important for similar reasons
to Laos. At the same time, Hughes (2005) argues
that reform was made possible by the fact that the
dominant political element, the leaders of the
Cambodian People’s Party, saw it as a way to gain
control over key economic resources and enhance its
position vis-à-vis its political opponents. In Uganda,
the emergence of a political leadership that was
committed to reform and that recognised that earlier
state-led policies had failed was a key factor, as was
the fact that massive donor funding gave them
enormous leverage over the government (Robinson
2005). In Mozambique, donor leverage stemming
from aid dependence and the political leadership’s
commitment to reform were also the key factors in
precipitating reform (Kulipossa 2005). In Burundi,
political conditions conducive to reform evaporated
following the onset of severe violent conflict in the
early 1990s, resulting in an aborted programme of
reform (Lemarchand 2005).
The second factor that shaped the sample countries’
respective performances regarding real economic
growth and human development was the way in
which the reform process was managed in political
terms. While the introduction of reforms was
necessary for turnaround, it was not sufficient – it
had to be well managed politically. In all the
turnaround cases (Vietnam, Uganda, Indonesia during
the 1960s and 1970s, Mozambique and Laos), the
introduction of economic reforms was initially aimed
at overcoming fiscal crises, outbreaks of
hyperinflation, or some other type of economic
crisis. The introduction of these measures generally
paved the way for further economic reforms by
demonstrating the positive results that could be
achieved with limited market-based reform. In the
Indonesian case, for instance, the technocrats’ initial
success in stabilising the economy paved the way for
them to introduce new foreign and domestic
investment laws, reforms to the banking system, and
other market-based measures in the late 1960s
aimed at creating a more attractive environment for
capitalist investment. In Laos and Vietnam, economic
stabilisation during the late 1980s/early 1990s
strengthened the hand of market reformers within
the government and thereby made it possible for
structural reforms to be introduced in areas such as
foreign investment and privatisation. Uganda and
Mozambique provide similar stories. 
At the same time, however, these initial and
subsequent economic reforms potentially posed a
threat to key sections of the political and business
elite or other sections of the population with the
capacity to cause political disruption, creating in-built
resistance to at least certain elements of the reform
process. In turnaround cases, political leaders dealt
with this challenge by designing economic reform
programmes in such a way as to effectively protect
these groups or compensate them in some way for
their losses. In Laos, for instance, the military was
awarded new timber contracts and trading rights and
privatisation deals were structured in such a way as to
leave state enterprise managers in effective control
of their enterprises, thus protecting or compensating
both groups for any costs they suffered as a result of
reform. Similarly in Uganda retrenched civil servants
were provided with generous severance packages to
reduce the political backlash from large-scale
reductions in civil service numbers. In Indonesia, the
government introduced measures to assist indigenous
business groups after widespread rioting in Jakarta in
early 1974. In all turnaround countries, elite groups
that controlled access to state facilities and largesse
were effectively protected through the non-
implementation of institutional reforms. In no cases
did political leaders seek to promote a significant shift
in the balance of power between the major
contending political forces within their respective
countries – while some leaders (such as those in
Uganda) appear to have been strongly committed to
market-oriented economic reform, they were not
trying to promote a revolution. At the same time,
however, they did not allow reform processes to
become hijacked by elite elements. 
This is where Cambodia and Indonesia (in the 1980s
and 1990s) arguably went wrong. As Hughes (2005)
illustrates, in Cambodia reform measures became a
mechanism for elements within and associated with
the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to privatise state
wealth or seize assets (particularly land) from the poor.
Underlying this outcome, Hughes argues, was the
fractured structure of power and interest and the
CPP’s consequent desire to bolster its position with its
political opponents. Rather than placate its opponents
through strategic concessions as part of a genuine
reform programme, the CPP sought to bolster its
position with these opponents by maximising its
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control over resources. Similarly, in Indonesia,
economic reform was captured by powerful business
groups with close connections to the Suharto family.
The result was the transfer of state monopolies into
private hands and a pattern of financial sector reform
that left it vulnerable to external economic shocks.
When the rupiah collapsed in 1997, the consequences
of this hijacking became clear (Rosser 2005b).
In summary, outcomes in real economic growth and
human development in the sample cases depended
on two factors: whether or not political conditions
emerged in these countries that were conducive to
the introduction of at least modest programmes of
market-oriented economic reform and the extent
to which these programmes were managed so as to
keep elites onside while preventing them from
hijacking the reform process.
5 The role of donors
The degree to which donors influenced outcomes
regarding turnaround in the sample countries varied
from case to case. In some cases, donors played a
significant and positive role in promoting turnaround.
In other cases, they played a significant and negative
role. In other cases again, donors did not have a
significant influence on the outcome. 
To the extent that donors influenced outcomes vis-à-
vis turnaround in individual countries, it was typically
by shaping at least one of the following three factors
discussed previously: (1) whether opposition groups
were given a clear stake in the post-conflict political
order in cases where such groups had not been
eliminated by military conflict or given up and gone
home; (2) whether political conditions emerged that
were conducive to the introduction of a programme
of at least modest market-oriented economic
reform; and (3) whether this programme of reform
was managed in such a way as to ensure that
political and business elites neither blocked crucial
economic reforms nor hijacked the process of
reform. For obvious reasons, donors had little
influence over the other key factors that were
mentioned above – the extent to which changes in
geopolitical conditions provided an incentive for
warring parties to lay down their arms, and the
extent to which one party to a conflict was able to
achieve a clear military victory over its opponents. 
Donors arguably played their most significant and
positive role vis-à-vis turnaround in Mozambique,
Uganda, Laos (during the late 1980s and 1990s) and
Indonesia (during the 1960s and 1970s). In all four
countries, donors helped to create a political
environment conducive to market-oriented reform by
providing governments with much-needed aid and
taking advantage of the leverage that this gave them
to press the case for liberal market policies. The
amount of aid provided to these countries varied from
case to case (see Figures 1 and 2). But in all cases, the
aid was desperately needed – in Mozambique, Uganda
and Laos because of the absence of alternative long-
term sources of government finance, and Indonesia
because of the temporary effects of the mid-1960s
economic crisis. Donors thus had considerable scope
for pressuring governments in all countries to adopt
market-oriented reforms. At the same time, donors
also contributed to turnaround in these countries in
other ways. In Mozambique, as noted earlier, donors
ensured that the opposition movement, Renamo,
developed a stake in the post-conflict political order
by providing it with the seed capital it needed to
transform itself into a viable political party. In Uganda,
Laos and Indonesia, donors played a role in the
successful political management of the reform process
by, in the Ugandan case, providing the funding needed
for civil service severance packages (which served to
ameliorate civil service opposition to the reform
process) and in the Indonesian and Laotian cases,
tolerating deviations from the path of market-
oriented reform and widespread corruption (which
enabled governments to maintain necessary political
support). While donors strongly criticised these
aspects of the Laotian and Indonesian political
economies, they were not so aggrieved by them as to
withdraw their aid programmes. 
In Burundi, Cambodia and Indonesia during the
1980s and 1990s, by contrast, the role of donors was
more problematic. In Burundi, donors and other
international actors failed to provide opposition
groups with a stake in the planned post-conflict
political order. On the one hand, as noted earlier,
key opposition groups were excluded from peace
negotiations, reflecting a decision by Tanzanian
President Julius Nyerere, the main facilitator of the
peace negotiations in Burundi, to include rebel
movements in the negotiations but not the factions
that had broken away from them. On the other
hand, the sheer number of international actors that
were involved in the peace process worked against
the formulation of a coherent political reform
package, as did the decision of donors to withdraw
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their funding from Burundi en masse in the mid-
1990s (Lemarchand 2005). In Cambodia and
Indonesia, by contrast, the main problem was that
donors’ actions served to facilitate the hijacking of
the economic reform process. As Hughes (2005)
points out, donors’ failure to engage early and
proactively with the state enabled the Cambodian
People’s Party to entrench itself within the state,
and in turn seize almost total control over the
implementation of reforms. In Indonesia, the
problem was that insofar as donors encouraged the
Indonesian government to deregulate the country’s
financial system before it had established the
necessary prudential safeguards, it facilitated the
hijacking of the reform process by well-connected
business groups. 
Finally, in Laos during the 1970s and early 1980s and
Vietnam, donors, or more specifically Western
donors, appear to have had relatively little influence
over outcomes vis-à-vis turnaround. The victory of the
Laotian and Vietnamese communist parties in 1975
led to the withdrawal en masse of several Western
donors from these countries. Insofar as individual
donors remained, they exercised relatively little
influence over the government, both because of
geopolitical factors and because the aid they provided
was relatively insignificant compared to the aid
provided by the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries. In Laos, as noted previously, Western
donors came to have greater influence over Laos
following the end of the Cold War. The same thing
does not appear to have happened in Vietnam. As
Fforde (2005) points out, the emergence of a
political climate conducive to economic policy reform
in the late 1980s in Vietnam had much more to do
with changes within the Vietnamese state than with
donor influence, perhaps reflecting the relatively
limited amounts of aid that donors have provided to
that country. As Figure 1 shows, donor funding to
Vietnam fluctuated between 2 and 6 per cent of
gross national income (GNI) between 1989 and 2000;
much lower percentages than Laos and most of the
other fragile states that are examined here. Vietnam
is best regarded as an example of internally driven
turnaround. In this context, donor contributions have
not been either positive or negative. They have just
not been especially consequential. 
What factors shaped the degree of donor success in
promoting turnaround in the sample of countries? First,
and perhaps most fundamentally, the case studies
suggest that donor success was a function of the
degree of donor engagement in these countries. In
all turnaround countries, donors had a continuous
presence during their turnaround phases. They saw
the job through. Continuous engagement did not
necessarily ensure turnaround, nor did large volumes
of aid, as the Cambodian case illustrates. But the
decision of donors to withdraw en masse from
Burundi in the mid-1990s doubtless severely reduced
that country’s chances of achieving turnaround. And
the withdrawal of many donors from Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam in the 1970s for geopolitical
reasons dramatically reduced the resources available
to these countries for promoting turnaround and
limited donor influence over the development of
policy in these countries. Predictability of donor
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Figure 1 Aid as a percentage of gross national income, 1989–2000
SourceWorld Bank, World Development Indicators CD-Rom (2004).
support, both financial and political, appears to have
been just as important in enabling donors to make a
positive contribution to outcomes vis-à-vis
turnaround as the financial value of that support.
Second, the case studies suggest that donor success
in contributing to turnaround was in part a function
of how well they used the resources at their disposal
and the leverage that this gave them. This in turn
was a function of the quality of advice they provided
and the timing of and strategies for their
engagement. While donors generally provided useful
policy advice, they did not do so in all cases, as the
case of financial reform in Indonesia during the
1980s attests. Nor did they always take advantage of
opportunities for constructive engagement when
they arose or pursue effective strategies when they
did engage. Early constructive engagement with the
state in Mozambique and Uganda proved crucial to
donor success in promoting turnaround in these
countries while in Cambodia, as noted earlier, the
fact that donors operated through parallel structures
contributed to later problems. International actors’
use of diplomatic and aid-based strategies to secure
the inclusion of opposition groups in Mozambique
and Cambodia proved effective in ensuring that
these groups developed a stake in the post-conflict
political order but their exclusion of certain
opposition elements from the peace process in
Burundi had the opposite effect.
Finally, the case studies suggest that the nature of
countries’ broader political economies also affected
the extent to which donors were successful in
promoting turnaround. For instance, as noted above,
geopolitical considerations meant that Western
donors exercised little influence over policy and
economic outcomes in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos
prior to the late 1980s, even if they remained
engaged in these countries. It was only after the
collapse of the Soviet Union that they came to
exercise much influence over policy, although this
influence has been much more significant in Laos and
Cambodia than in Vietnam. Similarly, the victory of
counter-revolutionary forces over communist and
radical nationalist forces in Indonesia in the mid-
1960s paved the way for a close relationship between
Western donors and the government during the late
1960s and 1970s. The onset of the oil boom in the
mid-1970s shifted the balance of power away from
donors and their technocratic allies and towards
economic nationalists within the government and
well-connected domestic capitalists by reducing the
government’s need for external financial assistance. In
this context, donors exercised much less influence
over economic policy than they had during the late
1960s and early 1970s. Whether or not countries had
a corps of liberal economic technocrats who shared
donors’ economic policy preferences also appears to
have had some impact on their success in promoting
turnaround in the sample countries. For instance,
donors have had a much easier time in promoting
reform in Uganda, where such a corps of technocrats
exists, than they have in Laos, where such a corps of
technocrats has not yet been created. 
In summary, the role of donors in influencing
outcomes vis-à-vis turnaround in the sample
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Figure 2 Aid per capita, 1989–2000 ($US)
SourceWorld Bank, World Development Indicators CD-Rom (2004).
countries was mixed, being significant and positive in
some cases, more problematic in other cases, and
insignificant in other cases yet again. This variation in
turn reflected a series of factors including the degree
of donor engagement, how well donors used the
resources at their disposal and the leverage that this
gave them, and the broader character of the
political economies in which they were engaged.
6 Donor strategies for engaging with fragile
states
What are the implications of these findings for donor
strategies for engaging with fragile states?What do
they suggest donors should do in order to
successfully promote turnaround in fragile states? A
useful starting point in addressing these questions is
the report of the World Bank’s Task Force on Low
Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) (2002). This
report outlines a strategy for donor engagement in
fragile states that consists of two elements. The first
focuses on improving policies, institutions and
governance in fragile states and involves the
promotion of ‘zero-generation’ reforms. In essence,
it advises donors, in consultation with domestic
stakeholders, to (1) identify a ‘highly focused reform
agenda’ that is likely to have an immediate positive
impact and is achievable in political terms and then
(2) work strategically to build a coalition for reform.
The second element of the strategy is to improve the
provision of basic social services by supplementing
weak central government delivery with multiple
alternative channels (Task Force on LICUS 2002: v).
The Task Force argues that because of institutional
weakness in fragile states, the successful delivery of
basic services requires the use of alternative channels
outside the state, such as non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and private businesses. 
At the same time, the Task Force makes two general
recommendations. The first of these is that donors
should focus on the use of knowledge-based
instruments in engaging with fragile states rather
than finance-based instruments. Insofar as the latter
are used, it suggests, they should involve the provision
of grants rather than loans. The second
recommendation is that donors should remain
engaged in fragile states over time, notwithstanding
the difficulties associated with operating in these
countries and, in particular, the apparent relative
ineffectiveness of aid: ‘Although the work of the Task
Force reaffirms the lesson that finance should
continue to reflect performance, total disengagement
from LICUS may have larger implications. Countries
abandoned by the international development
community show few signs of recovery, and
meanwhile their populations suffer severe
deprivation’ (Task Force on LICUS 2002: iv).
Below I consider each of these elements and
recommendations in the light of the findings I have
previously outlined, as well as proposing some
additional elements for donor strategies for
engaging in fragile states.
6.1 Promotion of zero-generation reforms
In all the turnaround cases (Vietnam, Uganda, Indonesia
during the 1960s and 1970s, Mozambique, and Laos)
economic reform programmes began with or included
at an early stage measures to stabilise the economy
after some type of economic crisis, proceeded to
include trade and financial sector deregulation
measures and in some cases privatisation of state-
owned enterprises but generally did not include serious
attempts to combat corruption, create clean and
efficient judicial systems, or introduce much of the
other institutional infrastructure that is required for a
market economy. Such a pattern of economic reform
is broadly consistent with the ‘zero-generation’ reform
strategy insofar as it suggests that supporters of
economic reform should focus initially on promoting
those measures that are most easily achievable
politically and which are likely to have the greatest
impact in economic terms. At the same time, however,
there is little evidence in the country cases to suggest
that donors and other supporters of economic reform
pursued this pattern of economic reform as part of a
conscious and well thought out political strategy. In
general, economic policy making was driven either by a
need to overcome economic crisis, a recognition that
past economic policies had not worked, or struggles
between competing coalitions of interest. In other
words, economic reforms were not introduced
according to some master template devised by
supporters of economic reform. At the same time,
economic reform did not occur in a piecemeal manner
initially and build to a more wide-ranging programme
of economic reform, as the zero-generation reform
strategy suggests will occur. Rather, crisis conditions
and changed political circumstances led to a burst of
economic reform activity as reformers tried to push
through as much reform as possible while these
conditions/ circumstances prevailed. There was little
that was strategic about the introduction of these
reforms except insofar as reformers recognised that
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they had to move quickly while there was an
opportunity to do so.
6.2 Supplementing weak central government
delivery by strengthening multiple alternative
channels
The case studies suggest that government channels
in fragile states can be effective in delivering basic
services, notwithstanding relatively low government
capacity. In Uganda, for instance, donors funded the
delivery of basic services primarily through the
provision of general budgetary support (GBS).
Robinson (2005) notes that donors favoured GBS
because it reduced transaction costs, facilitated direct
engagement on government budget priorities, and
enabled greater donor coordination. While there
was some leakage of budget support funds initially,
the implementation of expenditure tracking surveys
reduced the scope for this. Similarly, Kulipossa
(2005) notes that sector-wide approaches (SWAps)
have proven highly effective in Mozambique:
Whereas in the 1990s government-donor
interactions were characterized by competition,
duplication, stringent conditions, bypassing of
government, and the creation of parallel
structures, at present their relationships are now
based on sector-wide approaches (SWAps),
partnership, ownership, accountability, and
transparency. As a result, there is greater
organization and complementarity in each sector,
fewer donor demands on government capacity,
and improved fiscal management. SWAps have
enabled the government to incorporate all
funding for each sector into the national budget,
given it greater freedom to design and implement
strategies and programmes and allocate resources
to better achieve intended results. Under SWAps,
donor resources flow through pooled accounts
and are managed through government
procedures and systems. All of this enhances
resource planning, expenditure control, and
performance management systems that are
leading to current financial management reforms.
At the same time, as noted earlier, the Cambodian
case suggests that the establishment of parallel
structures for the delivery of aid outside the
government can contribute to governance problems
that impair prospects for turnaround by increasing
the likelihood that economic reforms will be hijacked
by powerful elites. 
None of this is to argue that donors should not seek
to use non-governmental channels for the delivery
of basic services where doing so makes sense. But
my findings suggest that non-state mechanisms for
service delivery should not be inherently preferred to
government mechanisms. There is no reason, on the
basis of the evidence here, to presume that
governments will not be able to deliver basic services
effectively, especially if there is close monitoring of
the use of public funds. At the same time, there are
clear benefits in terms of capacity-building within
the state from using government channels for
service delivery. In this sense, rather than trying to
supplement ‘weak central government delivery by
strengthening multiple alternative channels’ a more
profitable strategy is arguably to look at ways of
strengthening existing government channels for
service delivery.
6.3 Knowledge vs. finance
The analysis here suggests that the World Bank Task
Force’s proposal that donors should focus on the use
of knowledge-based instruments in engaging in
fragile states rather than finance-based ones is also
problematic. There are three reasons for this. First,
the case studies show that while donors contributed
to turnaround in a number of countries through the
provision of policy advice – Indonesia during the late
1960s, Mozambique and Uganda spring most readily
to mind – they also show that donors did not always
provide good advice – the best example in this
respect being their advice to the Indonesian
government in the late 1980s in relation to financial
sector reform. Second, the case studies suggest that
while large volumes of aid were not a precondition
for turnaround – Vietnam and Indonesia during the
1960s did not require large volumes of aid to achieve
turnaround and large aid receipts did not guarantee
Cambodia a good performance vis-à-vis turnaround
– there can be little doubt that large volumes of aid
were needed in some cases. For instance, it is
difficult to imagine Mozambique, Uganda and Laos
achieving turnaround had it not been for the fact
that donors contributed most of the resource
needed to fund governments in those countries,
provide basic services and so on. In all these cases, it
is unclear what alternative sources of funding could
have been used for these purposes, given their
relative lack of natural resources or other sources of
income. In the absence of donor funding, it seems
quite possible that these states would have simply
collapsed. Finally, the fact that donors were able to
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provide finance gave them leverage over policy
decisions at crucial junctures and influence over
outcomes vis-à-vis turnaround. To abandon finance-
based aid instruments in favour of knowledge-based
ones would be to forgo such influence.
This is not meant to be an argument against donor
provision of technical assistance during processes of
turnaround. Chauvet and Collier (2005) have argued
that technical assistance can assist turnaround in
countries going through the early stages of
turnaround (defined in their case in terms of an
improved CPIA score). My cases provide plenty of
examples of donors contributing to the initial stages
of turnaround by providing technical assistance in
one form or another to support reform processes.
Assuming that broader political conditions are
conducive to economic reform, there is no reason,
based on the cases, to assume that such an approach
will not be helpful in promoting turnaround. What
the cases suggest may be problematic is a strategy of
focusing only on technical assistance over the long
term in countries where governments do not have
access to other substantial sources of revenue. The
successful use of GBS and SWAps in countries such
as Uganda and Mozambique suggests that donor
funding beyond the provision of technical assistance
can be used effectively to promote turnaround in
countries that do not have access to such income
and, in particular, promote the delivery of basic
services while building government capacity.
6.4 Remaining engaged
The World Bank Task Force’s proposal that donors
should remain engaged in fragile states,
notwithstanding the difficulties involved in operating
there, is well supported by the analysis here. As
noted above, continued donor engagement was a
feature of turnaround in all the successful cases and
was particularly important in aid dependent cases
such as Laos, Uganda and Mozambique. Such
continued donor engagement will of course not be
easy to achieve. As new development challenges
emerge and the geopolitical interests of major states
shift, donor organisations may find that they are
unable to give fragile states the high priority that
they currently have. One can only hope that the
current interest in promoting development in fragile
states outlives the current concern about ensuring
the security of the West by battling international
terrorism and its causes.
6.5 Additional measures
The findings here suggest that donor strategies for
engaging in fragile states could usefully include three
additional elements. The first of these is permitting
governments in fragile states to introduce strategic
measures aimed at placating groups, particularly
within the elite, that stand to lose from reform. This
was a feature of economic policy making in all the
turnaround cases. In all these cases, the introduction
of such measures served to generate political
conditions conducive to economic reform by
reducing the potential for opposition to reform. In
practice, donors seem to do this already, so this is
not something which would necessarily lead a
marked change in existing practice. The second
additional element is recognising that the nature of
the broader political economy in which donors are
operating will shape the potential for economic
reform. The point here is that donors need to have a
good sense of whether or not economic reform is
politically possible before they go investing time,
money and effort in trying to promote it. At the
same time, donors can take actions that may serve
to improve the political climate for reform. Chauvet
and Collier (2005) have suggested that increasing
investment in secondary education may be one way
of doing this, given that, according to their results,
the proportion of people in low-income countries
who are enrolled in secondary education is highly
correlated with reform. My analysis suggests that
there are various other factors that shape the
political conditions for reform – the geopolitical
climate, the commitment of political leaders, the
balance of power between competing coalitions of
interest, and the degree of donor leverage, to name
a few. While many of these factors are beyond
donor influence, some are not. Donor leverage, for
instance, is at least partly a function of donor
willingness to provide funding. Where the political
climate for reform is entirely beyond donor control,
donors should focus on keeping track of political
developments with a view to spotting opportunities
for the introduction of reforms. Finally, donor
strategies for engaging in fragile states should include
actions aimed at ensuring that in conflict cases,
opposition groups are given a stake in new political
order. As noted above, this proved crucial to securing
a durable cessation of conflict in those countries
where opposition groups did not suffer outright
defeat on the battlefield or decide to cease fighting,
pack up, and return to their countries of origin.
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